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While in Graham it was suggested that a history of accidents or complaints might
bring a danger that does not appear unusual, unseen, unfamiliar or otherwise special
within the scope of the duty,19 Lord Bracadale held in Cowan that an absence of
previous accidents or complaints was not a consideration that could be given much
weight.20 Notwithstanding the alleged presence of ha-has in country houses,21 Lord
Bracadale was firmly of the view that this was “an unusual feature about which
someone crossing in the dark would be likely to be unaware”.22 He also considered
the annual bat walk itself to be an unusual event, because visitors were not normally
brought onto the property after dark. In short, a clean record gained in normal
circumstances will not be decisive when circumstances change significantly.
Lord Bracadale described the case as being fact specific.23 This appears to be
an inherent feature of occupiers’ liability and Cowan serves as a useful reminder
that the question of what care is reasonable “always relates to the particular person
in the case”.24 It follows that the circumstances under which a person comes onto
the property continue to be factually relevant notwithstanding the abolition of the
rigid categories of invitee, licensee and trespasser.25 Whether that relevance is truly
restricted to the factual question of reasonable care or intrudes into the issue of duty
may provide scope for further discussion. If there is any merit in the contention of
counsel for the pursuer in Graham that “the ambit of an occupier’s duty required
to be considered afresh in the circumstances of each particular case”,26 then, in the
context of obvious dangers at least, some conceptual overlap may be found between
the existence of the duty and its breach.
Gordon Cameron
University of Dundee
EdinLR Vol 17 pp 398-405
The Agent’s Warranty of Authority: Thus Far
but No Further
As a general rule, an unauthorised agent is unable to create binding legal relations
between his principal and a third party. The third party who is unaware that the agent
lacks authority suffers disappointed expectations, since the anticipated contract with
19 Graham at 61 per Lord Emslie.
20 Cowan at para 36.
21 It is understood that ha-has feature in John Buchan’s Huntingtower and possibly also in George Eliot’s
Middlemarch, though the author does not claim to have read either.
22 Cowan at para 36.
23 Para 38.
24 Gill (n 5) para 325 with reference to s 2(1) of the Act: “[b]ecause the duty to the person in the 1960 Act
is to show reasonable care ‘that that person will not suffer injury or damage”’ (emphasis added).
25 Ibid. See also DMWalker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, 2nd edn (1981) 581 and 585.
26 Graham at 60.
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the principal does not materialise, and is protected in different ways. The principal
may choose to ratify the transaction, in which case it becomes binding on both parties
from the moment the agent purported to enter into it on the principal’s behalf. The
principal who does not wish to ratify may nevertheless have created the impression
that the agent was authorised, potentially resulting in apparent authority. This legal
concept operates to prevent the principal from acting in an inconsistent way by
creating then denying the appearance of authority and if the third party raises an
action against the principal, the latter is barred from denying that the agent was
authorised. Both ratification and apparent authority focus on the relationship between
principal and third party. However, the third party also has a valid action against an
agent who has misrepresented the existence or extent of his authority, namely the
action for breach of warranty of authority. There is very little Scottish case law on this
action, and so the recent Inner House joined cases, Cheshire Mortgage Corporation
Limited v Grandison and Blemain Finance Limited v Balfour Manson LLP,1 provide
a welcome analysis of the legal principles.
A. NATURE OF THE WARRANTY
An agent provides an implied warranty to third parties that he is authorised by his
principal. If that warranty proves to be incorrect, provided the third party relied on
the warranty and has suffered a loss, the agent may be liable in damages to the third
party.
The action is an unusual one and appears not to be a native Scottish concept,
having simply been adopted into Scots from English law. It is based on an implied
contract and as such imposes strict liability on the agent, with the result that even
the agent who honestly believes he is authorised will be liable to the third party in
damages if such a belief was incorrect.
In these joined cases the attempt to extend the ambit of the warranty of authority
was unsuccessful. Lord Clarke, delivering the Inner House decision, stated:2
We are of the clear view that there are no reasons in principle or practice, for extending the
somewhat limited scope and nature of the implied warranty of agents in the way in which
the reclaimers’ submissions in the present case contended for.
B. THE FRAUDULENT SCHEMES
These cases arose as a result of fraudulent schemes, the nature of which can be
illustrated by reference to the facts in Cheshire. A man and a woman approached
lenders purporting to be real individuals, the aptly-named Mr and Mrs Cheetham of
34 Danube Street, Edinburgh. The couple requested a loan which was to be secured
over the property in Danube Street. The fraud was very convincing as the fraudsters
possessed a number of documents including drivers’ licences and utility bills. On the
1 [2012] CSIH 66, [2013] PNLR 3.
2 [2012] CSIH 66 at para 31.
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day the offer letter was issued, they consulted a solicitor, instructing him to act on
their behalf. They explained that the title deeds had been lost and extract registered
title deeds were produced. The solicitor acted only for the borrowers (and not also
the lenders) in procuring the loan from the lenders. Once the loan had been obtained
the fraudsters disappeared leaving the lenders with a standard security which, having
been granted by a non-owner, was ineffective.
The lenders chose to sue the solicitors acting for the fraudsters on the basis of
warranty of authority. It is well established that a solicitor acting as an agent warrants
to the party his client is transacting with (on these facts, the lenders) that he was
authorised. But does the solicitor further warrant that his client is who he claims to
be? This is the essential question raised by the joined cases, namely, as is so often
the case in agency, which of two innocent parties should bear the loss caused by
fraudulent actions.
C. OUTER HOUSE DECISION3
In the Outer House Lord Glennie rejected the lenders’ submissions:4
. . . it is, in my opinion, difficult to see any room for any implied representation by the
solicitors as to the identity of the borrowers for whom they were acting, other than that
they were acting for the people with whom the lenders were already engaged in a process
of finalising a loan transaction. Borrowing from Willes J’s formulation of the warranty in
Collen v Wright [1857 8 E & B 647], the solicitors here in each case did not (sic) more than
warrant “that the authority which (they professed) to have, did in point of fact exist.”
It was clearly relevant to Lord Glennie that the borrowers approached the lenders
directly, and were not introduced by the solicitors.
Lord Glennie also shed light on the legal basis of the action. Drawing on the
judgment of Buxton LJ in SEB Trygg Liv Holding AB v Manches5 he noted that
it is based on an implied collateral contract existing between agent and third party.
This is, of course, a legal fiction: there is no such contract. The contractual analysis
causes difficulties in English law because of the requirement of consideration since
the third party who benefits from the warranty seems to “get something for nothing”.
Consideration is, however, found in the act of the third party in entering into the
contract with the principal. Although Lord Glennie recognised that consideration is
not a requirement in Scots law, he nevertheless felt that it served a useful function:6
. . . the acts which amount to consideration may also indicate the acceptance necessary to
turn the representation or unilateral promise by the agent into a contract between the agent
and third party collateral to that purportedly entered into between the third party and the
agent’s professed principal.
His reference to a unilateral promise is interesting and is revisited below.
3 Cheshire Mortgage Corporation Limited v Grandison [2011] CSOH 157, 2012 SLT 672.
4 [2011] CSOH 157 at para 64.
5 [2006] 1 WLR 2276 at para 60.
6 [2011] CSOH 157 at para 56.
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To Lord Glennie, outcomes are highly dependent on the facts:7
. . . one cannot simply assume the existence of a warranty of authority in all cases. It is
necessary in each case to look at the relationship between the parties, and to examine closely
what was said, expressly or impliedly, by the agent in the context of that relationship, how
what was said could reasonably have been understood by the other party (the test, as always
in contract, being objective.)
This provides a reminder that the warranty is an implied one, shaped by the nature of
the legal relationship between agent and third party. An express warranty is possible,
if unlikely.
Quoting the decision of Lord Drummond Young in a recent case concerning a
similar type of fraud, Lord Glennie confirmed the limited scope of the warranty:8
Thus the representation relates to the person for whom the supposed agent purports to act.
It does not relate to the capacity in which that person, the supposed principal, will enter
into the transaction, or as to the property that person holds, or as to that person’s title to
property.
Finally, he confirmed that liability is strict: it makes no difference to the agent’s
liability that he honestly believed himself to be authorised.9
Returning to the facts, Lord Glennie sought to establish whether the warranty
in this case could extend to the principal’s identity. He emphasised the high degree
of contact between the mortgage company and the fraudsters before the solicitor
became involved:10
Of particular importance, to my mind, is the fact that, by the time the borrowers’ solicitors
became involved, the lenders knew who they were (or thought they were) dealing with.
They had made the decision in principle to lend to those individuals.
Lord Glennie’s decision illustrates the fact that the third party must be induced by
the agent to enter into a contract with the principal: if the third party knows that the
agent is not authorised, there can be no action for breach of warranty.
Although the researches of counsel could find no reported Scottish case in
which an agent had actually been held liable for breach of warranty of authority,
judicial analysis nevertheless exists in cases such as Anderson v Croall,11 Rederi
Aktiebolaget Nordstjernan v Christian Salvesan & Co,12 Irving v Burns,13 and Scott
v JB Livingstone & Nicol.14
7 Ibid.
8 Para 57, quoting from Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2009] CSOH 165, 2010
SLT 527 at para 27.
9 Para 58.
10 Para 63.
11 (1903) 6 F 153.
12 (1903) 6 F 64.
13 1915 SC 260.
14 1990 SLT 305. To these could be added Royal Bank of Scotland v Skinner 1931 SLT 382, in which Lord
MacKay confirmed the requirement of reliance on the warranty.
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D. INNER HOUSE DECISION15
The Inner House decision begins with the statement of principle from Willes J in
Collen v Wright:16
I am of opinion that a person, who induces another to contract with him as the agent of
a third party by an unqualified assertion of his being authorised to act as such agent, is
answerable to the person who so contracts for any damages which he may sustain by reason
of the assertion of authority being untrue. . . The fact that the professed agent honestly
thinks that he has authority affects the moral character of his act; but his moral innocence,
so far as the person whom he has induced to contract is concerned, in no way aids such
person or alleviates the inconvenience and damage which he sustains. The obligation arising
in such a case is well expressed by saying that a person, professing to contract as agent
for another, impliedly, if not expressly, undertakes to or promises the person who enters
into such a contract, upon the faith of the professed agent being duly authorised, that the
authority which he professes to have does in point of fact exist. The fact of entering into the
transaction with the professed agent, as such, is good consideration for the promise.
Lord Clarke characterised this statement as the simple process of implying a term
into mercantile transactions, drawing an analogy with the implied terms in the Sale of
Goods Act 1979 and the Bills of Exchange Act 1882.
He noted that this action had been received into Scots law from English law,
making reference to a statement of the law contained in Gloag and Henderson, The
Law of Scotland.17 He also referred to Irving v Burns18 both to illustrate the fact that
the third party must actually suffer a loss and to emphasise the limited nature of the
warranty. If the contract with the principal would have been a losing one anyway, for
example because the principal was insolvent, the agent has not caused a loss and will
not therefore be liable in damages.
Given that this is an English concept, reference was made to the leading English
text, which states:19
The basic warranty is only that the agent has authority from his principal: this is something
particularly within the agent’s knowledge. If the principal proves unreliable, that is
something in respect of which the third party could have made inquiries. Merely as agent,
therefore, the agent does not warrant that his principal is solvent, or will perform the
contract (if any). As can be seen below, in the context of litigation, the warranty is similarly
limited in that the agent (normally a solicitor) does not promise that a claim is valid.
Lord Clarke noted (as Lord Glennie had done in the Outer House) the classification
in English law as a collateral contract and the requirement of consideration.20 Excel
15 [2012] CSIH 66, [2013] PNLR 3.
16 1857 8 E & B 647 at 657.
17 Lord Coulsfield and H LMacQueen,Gloag and Henderson: The Law of Scotland, 12th edn (2007) para
19.26, contributed by Lord Coulsfield.
18 1915 SC 260.
19 P G Watts and F M B Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, 19th edn (2010) art 105.
20 [2012] CSIH 66 at para 26.
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Securities Ltd v Masood,21 a case involving a similar identity fraud, was described by
the court as being “good law for Scotland”.22 Lord Clarke quoted from the opinion of
Judge Hegarty in that case:23
An agent acting on behalf of an unidentified principal will not normally incur any personal,
contractual liability so long as he acts within the scope of his authority. Anyone contracting
with such an agent must look to the principal for any redress to which he is entitled as a
matter of contract. However, it is now well established that, in such circumstances, the agent
will normally be regarded as giving an implied warranty as to his authority. If, therefore, he
never had authority to act on behalf of the principal or if his authority has terminated or if
he exceeds the scope of his authority, he will be in breach of the implied warranty and will
be liable in damages to any person to whom the warranty was given. In the common case,
where the principal refuses to accept liability, the right of action against the agent for breach
of his warranty will be an effective substitute for the loss of any right of action against the
principal.
Judge Hegarty had noted the decision in Penn v Bristol & West BS and Ors24 and
concluded that, notwithstanding the result, it was not the case that the solicitor always
warranted his client’s identity. The Inner House agreed.25 Lord Clarke concluded as
follows:26
The identity of a person is made up from a bundle of qualifies or attributes. In particular
there is nothing in principle in the law of contract to prevent an agent from guaranteeing to
a third party that he has a principal who is the same person as appears on property registers,
for example, as the owner of a specific property. . . . but, in any event, where, as here, no
such express warranty was asked for, or given, matters must rest on the implied, warranty
of authority to be implied as a matter of law the extent and nature of which was defined
correctly in the Excel case.
E. CONCLUSIONS
In outlining the limitations on this concept, the Inner House provided a reminder of
the policy reasons behind it.27 The agent is in a better position than the third party to
verify whether he is actually authorised. As such, it seems fair to allow the loss to fall
on the agent rather than on the third party, who might find it difficult to establish the
limits of the agent’s authority. On these particular facts, to extend the warranty further
to encompass the client’s identity would be to place on the solicitor a risk which is the
lender’s risk in making a commercial decision to lend.28 It would, in effect, make
the solicitor a type of insurer of the lender’s losses. Given the forceful terms of Lord
21 [2010] Lloyds Rep PN 165.
22 [2012] CSIH 66 at para 28.
23 Para 29.
24 [1997] 1 WLR 1356.
25 [2012] CSIH 66 at para 29.
26 Para 30.
27 Para 29.
28 As explained in Excel Securities Ltd v Mahood [2010] Lloyds Rep PN 165 at para 102.
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Clarke’s judgment, future attempts to extend the warranty in other ways are equally
unlikely to be successful.
Whilst the restatement of the limitations is welcome, these joined cases highlight
the unusual nature of the warranty. The imposition of strict liability on the agent,
although the natural result of basing the action in contract, is harsh. A contractual
legal basis seems to have arisen through historical accident rather than any deliberate
choice: the action was developed before the rise of negligence in delict. Following
Hedley Byrne v Heller,29 a third party could choose to raise an action against the
agent for misrepresentation in delict. Unsurprisingly, there are few examples of third
parties choosing this path. The contractual action, which compensates the third party
for his disappointed expectations, is likely to result in a higher award of damages
than would be the case were the agent to choose the delictual route. However, if
the agent fraudulently misrepresented the extent of his authority, higher damages
would be available in delict. The contractual legal basis is now firmly embedded in
the law.
The existence of the contractual legal basis is all the more unfortunate bearing in
mind that the contract is a legal fiction. In English law it is based on an implied
collateral contract, consideration being provided when the third party enters into
a contract with the principal in exchange for the agent’s promise. The contract is
unilateral in nature. Scots law has simply adopted this action fromEnglish law without
pausing to ask whether a neater legal basis in Scots law would have been the unilateral
promise.30 The agent can be characterised as promising to the third party that he
is authorised. When this promise is breached, the third party has an action against
the agent for damages. Promise more accurately reflects the one-sided nature of the
dealings between agent and third party, for the third party bears no obligation towards
the agent. Neither legal team in the joined cases appears to have raised promise as
a possible legal basis in the Inner House, despite Lord Glennie’s brief reference to
promise in the Outer House, as noted above.
Given the English attitude towards privity of contract, promise cannot be used as
a legal basis in English law. This explains the choice of the collateral contract, and
the search for consideration. It is unsatisfactory that Scots law has simply adopted
a solution which is framed by the presence of consideration in English law. The
Inner House having confirmed the nature of the action, it now seems unlikely that
promise could be considered as an alternative legal basis. This, in turn, is indicative of
a wider problem, namely the failure to take account of promise as a possible solution
in commercial situations. It is a flexible and useful part of Scots law, particularly
bearing in mind that, in a commercial context, it need not be in writing.31 Complex
commercial contexts often involve the interaction of numerous commercial actors and
29 [1964] AC 465.
30 The current author originally made this suggestion in “Unauthorised agency in Scots Law”, in D Busch
and L Macgregor (eds), The Unauthorised Agent: Perspectives From European and Comparative Law
(2009) 261 at 291-296.
31 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 1(2)(a)(ii).
Vol 17 2013 analysis 405
the ability to recognise binding unilateral legal commitments is a facet of the Scottish
system which is unfortunately often ignored.
These are criticisms which relate to the structural nature of the action. It would,
of course, be unreasonable to expect the court completely to reshape the remedy in
the context of litigation. More radical change would only be possible if the issue were
considered by the Scottish Law Commission. In the meantime, we should welcome
the Inner House’s refusal to extend an already anomalous concept in a way which
would have been practically unworkable for the solicitors’ profession as a whole.
Laura Macgregor
University of Edinburgh
EdinLR Vol 17 pp 405-410
Unjustified Enrichment Claims: When Does the
Prescriptive Clock Begin to Run?
Two recent judgments of the Outer House of the Court of Session have considered
the question of when prescription starts to run in relation to an unjustified enrichment
claim. Unfortunately both judgments contain, it is respectfully submitted, errors
of analysis which suggest that the Scottish courts are not yet fully at ease with
the reformed law of unjustified enrichment developed in the so-called “enrichment
revolution” of the late 1990s. The present author has recently called, in discussing
another unjustified enrichment decision, for further development of the law by the
Inner House.1 The cases discussed below add further weight to this call.
Claims in unjustified enrichment are based upon a cause of action which rests,
in broad terms, on the principle that no-one should be unjustifiably enriched at the
expense of another.2 This principle may be broken down into several elements which
must be present before a claim in unjustified enrichment arises: (1) a gain made by
the defender, (2) at the expense of the pursuer, (3) which is unjustifiably retained by
the defender. One might also add a fourth requirement, that no relevant defence is
available to the defender, but this final consideration is not of primary importance in
calculating when prescription runs in enrichment claims. For that calculation, what is
crucial is the moment when the defender unjustifiably retains an enrichment at the
pursuer’s expense. It is that concurrence of the specified elements (1) to (3) above
that constitutes “the date when the obligation became enforceable”, which is the time
specified in section 6(3) of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 as the
moment from which the five year prescriptive period applicable to obligations arising
from unjustified enrichment begins to run.
1 See M Hogg, “Continued uncertainty in the analysis of unjustified enrichment” 2013 SLT (News) 111.
2 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Lothian Regional Council 1995 SC 151 at 155 per Lord
President Hope.
